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BLOCKAGE VALUATION IN FEDERAL TAX LAW
By HARROP A. FREEMAN t and STEPHEN P. VINCIGUERRA t
Rebecca died at the age of eighty-five. In life she conceived only
four children. In death, she gave birth to many more problem chil-
dren. For, Rebecca was possessed of 58,557 shares of Bridal Night-
gown Company common stock, and her flesh and blood progeny owned
the other 41,443 shares.
To the Federal Tax Collector, problems of valuation were not
new. In fact, his training antedated the stock market crash of 1929,
and from personal experience he recalled that sales of a few shares
did not guarantee the sale of a large block of shares at the same price.
He knew that value is an association of an item of property in terms
of money and is a question of fact to be determined from all the cir-
cumstances, and that in order to have such value the stock must
possess potential, easy and prompt realization. But, alas, he turned
to his books, seeking a definition from whence to begin.
GENERAL VALUATION
There he found that the statutes, the tax regulations, and the
courts assumed that the phrase "fair market value" possessed a mean-
ing. Yet apparently, attempts to define "value" had been in vain,-
or rather successful in establishing that value may mean one thing for
one purpose, and quite a different thing for another. For value is a
word of many meanings,1 and if it. be taken from its environment, it
becomes as a fish out of water-lifeless. Its connotation will differ
according to the use, whether it be applied in bankruptcy, condemna-
tion, rate-fixing, accounting or taxation.
"Valuation . . . means the procedure and technique of esti-
mating the value of specific property at a stated time and place." 2
Here our environment is taxation, and for purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code, the regulations have attempted to define, S albeit
obtusely, what is meant by "fair market value."
t Professor of Law and Secretary, the Cornell Law School.
T LL. M., Cornell, 1945; member, New York Bar.
I. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. P. S. C., 262
U. S. 276, 310 (1923).
2. I BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (Ist ed. 1937) 10.
3. Regulations 105, Relating to the Estate Tax, Section 81.Io (941):
Valuation of Property.
(a) General-The value of every item of property includible in the gross
estate is the fair market value thereof at the time of decedent's death; . . . The
fair market value is the price at which the property would change hands between
(365)
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This the regulations do via the hypothetical willing-but-not-
obliged-to-buy-purchaser premise.4 We are further directed to seek
the market price or the mean between the highest and the lowest
quoted selling prices on the valuation date and to take into considera-
tion all relevant facts and elements of value.
BLOCKAGE VALUATION
Rebecca died possessed of a block of over 58,000 shares, nearly
6oo of the outstanding stock. May the size of the holdings be con-
sidered as a relevant fact or element of value? Economically speaking,
the laws of supply and demand do realistically affect price. As was
proved in 1929, a supply greater than an existing demand will depress
the market. Can this principle of elementary economics be applied to
the valuation of securities under existing law?
After having twice been declared invalid,5 the 1934 Regulations
expressly prohibiting a discount for blockage were revised,6 and those
a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or
to sell. The fair market value of a particular kind of property includible in the
gross estate is not to be determined by a forced sale price. Such value is to be
determined by ascertaining as a basis the fair market value as of the applicable
valuation date of each unit of the property. For example, in the case of shares
of stock or bonds, such unit of property is a share or a bond. All relevant facts
and elements of value as of the applicable valuation date should be considered in
every case.
(b) Real Estate ...
(c) Stocks and Bonds.-The value of stocks and bonds, within the meaning
of the Internal Revenue Code, is the fair market value per share or bond on the
applicable valuation date.
In the case of stocks and bonds listed on a stock exchange, the mean between
the highest and lowest quoted selling prices on the valuation date shall be consid-
ered as the fair market value per share or bond ...
If actual sales or bona fide bid and asked prices are not available, then . . .
in the case of shares of stock, upon the basis of the company's net worth, earning
power, dividend-paying capacity, and all other relevant, factors having a bearing
upon the value of the stock. Complete financial and other data upon which the
valuation is based should be submitted with the return.
In cases in which it is established that the value per bond or share of any secu-
rity determined on the basis of selling or bid and asked prices as herein provided
does not reflect the fair market value thereof, then some reasonable modification
of such basis or other relevant facts and elements of value shall be considered in
determining fair market value.
4. This is very nearly the definition of "fair market value" found in Metropolitan
Street Railway Co. v. Walsh, 197 Mo. 392, 398, 94 S. W. 86o, 86i (19o6) : "the price
which property will bring when it is offered for sale by one who is willing, but who is
not obliged, to sell it, and is bought by one who is willing or desires to purchase, but
is not compelled to do so." See also Helvering v. Wallbridge, 7o F. (2d) 683 (C. C. A.
2d, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 594 (1934) ; Tracy v. Comm'r., 53 F. (2d) 575 (C. C.
A. 6th, 193) ; Doric Apartment Co. v. Comm'r., 94 F. (2d) 895 (C. C. A. 6th. 1938).
5. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 95 F. (2d) 8o6 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938),
and Comm'r. v. Shattuck, 97 F. (2d) 79o (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
6. Regulations 8o (1934), Art. 13 (3), read in part:
"In exceptional cases in which it is established by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the value per bond or share of any security determined upon the basis
of selling or bid and asked prices as herein provided does not reflect the fair mar-
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presently in force now directly permit some reasonable modification
of the basis of "mean between bid and asked prices" where it can be
shown that market quotations do not show actual fair market value.
The rule that the value of a block of stock is conclusively estab-
lished merely by multiplying the value of one share at the market on
the valuation date by the number of shares has been rejected by recent
decisions. 7  Further, the courts recognize that a market in which sales
of small lots can be accomplished at a specified price may lack the
body and breadth necessary to support sales of large blocks of securities
at the same unit price.s Although no clear rule can be stated it is
doubted whether the commission has ever applied the blockage rule
to a stockholding representing less than io% of the stock outstanding.
An interesting side-issue is whether several blocks transferred to several
persons at substantially the same time can be considered as one block.9
In the recent case of Groff v. Munford,10 where a deduction for
blockage was allowed, the Circuit Court said, "Estimates of value such
as we have discussed are difficult to justify in detail for they involve
factors the weight of which is uncertain, but they are more reliable
than appraisals made in disregard of the amount of stock to be valued."
As was said in Helvering v. Maytag,11 "As well as any contro-
verted question of administrative law may be settled without declara-
ket value thereof, other relevant facts and elements of value will be considered in
determining the fair market value. The size of holdings of any security to be
included in the gross estate is not a relevant factor, and will not be considered in
such determination."
The latest revision was by T. D. 5351, March 27, 1944.
7. Havemeyer v. U. S., 59 F. Supp. 537 (Ct. of Cl., 1945), where petitioner valued
I6o,ooo shares at $25.oo against market of $28.125 and 2oo0o other shares at $22.oo
against market of $24.5o, and won on both valuations. At page 549, the Court ob-
served, "The Board was right in basing its conclusions upon the realities as it found
them rather than upon considerations of abstract logic. It could not ignore the preg-
nant fact . . . thdt a large block of stock cannot be marketed and turned into money
as readily as a few shares." Comm'r. v. Stewart's Estate, 153 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1946) ; Colonial Trust Co. v. Kraemer, 63 F. Supp. 866 (D. C. Conn., 1945).
Note: The Commissioner is quick to refuse to follow a "market price" fixed by
a few sales when he feels that "intrinsic value" is greater, Walter v. Duffy, 287 F. 41
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1923); S. M. 2522, C. B. Dec. 1924, p. 23; Florence Guggenheim, 39 B.
T. A. 251, 117 F. (2d) 469 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ; Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Balti-
more, 35 B. T. A. 259, 95 F. (2d) 8o6 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
8. Richardson v. Comm'r., i5i F. (2d) io2 (C. C. A. 2d 1945) ; Rice v. Eisner,
I6 F. (2d) 358, 361 (C. C. A. 2d, i926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 764 (1927). "Any
attempt to market so large a quantity would have probably sent down the value far
below the prices which prevailed." Phipps v. Comm'r., 127 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. Ioth,
1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 645 (1942). Here the petitioner gave away ioooo
shares to thirteen donees on the same day. The court treated this as thirteen separate
blocks. Contra, Helvering v. Kimberley, 97 F. (2d) 433, 435 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938),
where the court said, "It is difficult to believe that the sale of three blocks of io,ooo
shares each would have had a different effect from a sale of one block of 3oooo
shares. . . ." But cf. Sewell L. Avery, 3 T. C. 963 (1944).
9. See note 8 supra.
io. i5o F. (2d) 825, 828 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). The Commissioner had valued 14,000
shares of Electrolux stock at the Montreal exchange rate on the date of the gift, but
the Tax Court reduced the valuation by $I.875 per share to $21.50.
II. 125 F. (2d) 55, 63 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 689 (1942).
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tion by the Supreme Court, it is established that the size of a block of
listed stock may be a factor to be considered in its valuation for gift
or estate tax purposes."
Even in cases where no reduction in value for blockage is allowed,
the courts generally pay dicta tribute to the rule.12  Those cases that
do not allow a reduction for blackage will be found to involve some
special element such as rising markets, 18 closely-held stock that shows
unusually high earnings,'14 actual trading of shares in quantities greater
than the block, 15 or a block that carries with it control of a cor-
poration.' 6
A very serious doubt can be raised as to the soundness of these
four positions. They all proceed on the assumption that within a
reasonable time after the critical date for valuation the owner is going
to be able to receive an amount equal to or greater than the value
fixed. But what kind of a valuation is this which uses totally unrelated
hindsight to fix a valuation.17 Compare two owners on January I,
1946, both facing a rising market. Mr. A values his stock at the
market $50 for he has only IO shares. The estate of Mr. B attempts
to value its stock at $45 because it holds ioo,ooo shares which the
market will not absorb on the day of death at $50. In six months there
has been a 2o increase. Mr. A received a profit of $io per share. If
Mr. B's estate is compelled to accept a valuation of $5o on January Ist
and yet cannot sell the stock within the six months for more than $55
($5 off market) its profit will be limited to $5 rather than $io.
These exceptions and the blockage rule properly raise the question
of the possible, and the most sound methods for valuing blocks of
securities:
12. Phipps v. Comm'r.. 127 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. ioth, i942), cert. denied, 317
U. S. 645 (1942) ; Robert L. Clause v. Comm'r., 5 T. C. 647 (1945), aff'd (C. C. A.
4th, Apr. i8, 1946).
13. Gamble v. Comm'r., ioi F. (2d) 565 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939), cert. denied, 3o6
U. S. 664 (1939). Wiihin four months, the stock had advanced from market of $28o.
to $350.
14. Allen, 3 T. C. 1224 (i944). The mean between high and low on the date of
gift of ioooo shares was accepted as fair market value.
i5. Mott v. Comm'r., 139 F. (2d) 317 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943), involving iooooO
shares of General Motors Corporation stock. In the two following months, 375,o0o
shares were traded with no depreciation in the market
16. If the stock to be valued carries with it the control of the corporation, the
value at market may be at a premium. Helvering v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 95
F. (2d) 8o6, 812 (1938). A very similar situation arises in the valuation of undi-
vided interests in land, resulting in a depressed value for a minority interest, and an
enhanced value for a controlling interest. Estate of Campanari, Tax Court Docket
No. 4384, July 23, 1945; Estate of Henry, Tax Court Docket No. 1o9972, Dec. 7, 1944.
17. The correct use of hindsight is more properly reflected in the Portage Silica
Co.. 11 B. T. A. 700 (1928), af'd., 49 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931), cert. denied,
284 U. S. 667 (1931), where it was used to demonstrate the unsoundness of theoretical
computations of an antecedent date. See also Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petro-
leum Process Co., 289 U. S. 689, 698 ('933), "But a different situation is presented
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i. They might be valued at market without modification (if a
market exists)18
2. At market modified by relevant considerations.19
3. At the discount which a recognized brokerage firm would de-
mand to market the securities in view of the breadth and
depth of the market.
4. At the present value of the sums which could be realized by
sale of the securities over the length of time required for sale
in order not to depress the market.19a
5. By dividing the assets by the number of shares outstanding 20
(a) modified by the income or market record
(b) unmodified.
6. By capitalization of the earnings of the corporation as is done
under A R M 34 to determine 1913 value or the value of
good-will. 21
7. Through "expert" testimony.
22
8. By prorating the "profit" on a later sale over the period from
date of purchase to date of sale, thus arriving at a "value"
on the basic date.
23
if years have gone by before the evidence is offered. Experience is then available to
correct uncertain Prophecy. Here is a book of wisdom that courts may not neglect
We find no rule of law that sets a clasp upon its pages, and forbids us to look within."
iS. It must be recognized that a market "may exist independent of . . . sales,"
Crowell v. Comm'r., 62 F. (2d) 51, 53 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
ig. It has been suggested that the use of the word "fair" in the statute bars "ex-
ceptional and extraordinary conditions giving an abnormal value for the moment to
stock." Strong v. Rogers, 72 F. (2d) 455 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S.
621 (1934). See also Regulations, supra note 3.
I9a. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 297 U. S. 135, 140 (1936) ; Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. of Baltimore, 35 B. T. A. 259, 95 F. (2d) 8o6 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
2o. Compare the Estate Tax Sections of the Int. Rev. Code and Regulation IO5,
sec. 8i.io, cited supra note 3, with Int. Rev. Code § 113 (a) (i4) (1939), "In deter-
mining the fair market value of stock in a corporation as of March I, 1913, due regard
shall be given to the fair market value of the assets of the corporation as of that date."
There is a general tendency to reject this as a controlling valuation method. Frank
C. Rand, 4o B. T. A. 223 (939), aff'd, 116 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
21. See also A. R. R. 252, 3 Cum. BuLL. 46 1920) ; Boyd v. Heiner, 5 A. F. T. R.
6o69 (W. D. Pa.); Rheinstrom v. Willcuts, 26 F. Supp. 3o6 (D. Minn. 1938) ; and the
various Ford stock valuations-12 B. T. A. 755, 12 B. T. A. 916, 12 B. T. A. 956, 12
B. T. A. 935, 12 B. T. A. io85, 12 B. T. A. 1111, 13 B. T. A. 2oi, 13 B. T. A. 223
(all decided in 1928).
22. The Commissioner is not bound to accept opinion evidence, Tracy v. Comm'r.,
53 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931), but it is admissible and often valuable, Heiner
v. Crosby, 24 F. (2d) i9i (C. C. A. 3rd, 1928), and may not be completely rejected,
Dempsey Mill Mfg. Co. v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 604 (App. D. C. 1931). An exhaustive
review of the issue of the weight to be given such opinion evidence will be in Gloyd
v. Comm'r., 63 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 633 (1938).
Note its extensive use in Colonial Trust Co. v. Kraemer, 63 F. Supp. 866 (D. C. Conn.,
1945).
23. T. D. 274o, June 24. i918; T. B. M. 73, I C. B. 35 (igig) ; Hays v. Gauley
Mountain Coal Co., 247 U. S. 189 (I918).
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CLOSED CORPORATION VALUATION
One of the necessary elements in a fair market is the existence of
a willing buyer. Where the stock of a corporation is closely held by
a few share-owners, the buyers are usually restricted in number to
those few. 24  Hence, the fair market value of a few shares will often
bear little resemblance to its book or intrinsic value. It may well be
that if the other stockowners are not particularly anxious to increase
their holdings, that it will have to be offered at a substantial discount,
or be held for sale for such a long period of time awaiting the appear-
ance of a willing buyer, that the owner can no longer be regarded as
a "willing" seller. Few people care to buy into a family affair.
25 If
"fair market value" is to be the criterion we shall find a difference
whether a minority interest or a majority interest 26 is being offered.
In Richardson v. Commissioner,27 thirty-three members of a
family owned all IOO,OOO shares of an investment company., The
securities and other assets on the critical day had a fair market value
of $9,8o9,ooo but the shares of the family corporation were not listed
on any exchange. In determining value, the Tax Court deducted ac-
crued taxes and other expenses, and divided by the number of shares
to reach a value of $95.509 per share. Except for a study of corporate
earnings and balance sheets, the Tax Court failed to specify which
other factors had actually been applied as having had weight and
relevance in its determination.
Petitioner argued that no outsider could be found to buy a minor-
ity interest (5100 shares) in a family corporation except at a sub-
stantial discount from the price based upon the asset value. Other
testimony showed that in respect of a group of comparable corporations
whose stocks were listed, there was a substantial differential between
market value and asset value.28, On appeal, Judge Hincks, who wrote
24. Cartier v. Comm'r., 37 F. (2d) 894, 895 (C. C. A. 6th, 193o). "Stock in a
close corporation is notoriously hard to sell. There is no market except that afforded
by the few other stockholders."
25. A. B. C. Dohrmann, i B. T. A. 507, 515 (1930).
26. See note 16 supra.
27. i51 F. (2d) l02, 1O3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). The second half of the decision
involved the unlisted stock. The first half involved 12,487 shares of Vick Chemical
Company stock. Sales averaged 4,000 per month, and under 4oo per day in the gift
year. For the six months preceding the critical date, the price trend was moderately
upward. No blockage deduction was allowed, because "the tribunal charged with the
task of valuation will not lightly deviate from evidence based on actual sales; only
when it is convinced by persuasive evidence that at the critical time the market was
such that it could not absorb saled in the larger volume at-the price level obtaining for
small lots will it conclude that such prices must be discounted in arriving at the fair
market value pf large blocks."
28. The 1944 amendment to section 8r.xo (v) specifically authorizes consideration
as a relevant factor the value of securities of corporations engaged in the same or a
similar line of business whose securities are listed on an exchange. Cf. note 3 supra
and Int. Rev. Code § 811 (k) (1944 Amend.).
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the opinion, expressed the belief that the Tax Judge had applied some
personal notion of intrinsic value 29 instead of fair market value, as
required by Treasury Department regulations. Feeling that there was
substantial doubt as to the proper standards applied in the Tax Court
for this valuation, he favored a remand, but was overruled by his
brethren on the court.
In Blackard v. Commissioner,3" the same issue was decided, but
with the opposite result. The District Court reversed the Tax Court
and allowed a 25% deduction in valuing 4,584 shares in a family cor-
poration for estate tax purposes. The opinion rejected a determination
of value arrived at by dividing the total value of the gross assets by
the number of outstanding shares as being arbitrary, and fixing an
excessive value upon the shares. "The method followed was in con-
flict with the then prevailing regulations of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue as promulgated by the Secretary of Treasure." 31
The use of the words "fair market value" when applied to closely
held stock is meaningless. Because there is no market to guide, such
stock must be appraised in some other way. Other factors such as
trend of business,' earnings, book value, blockage, minority or con-
trolling interest, and intrinsic worth are material. However, care must
be exercised in closely held stock to distinguish intrinsic value from
clear market value, as the two are easily confused. 2 Interfamily
transactions merit little if any weight in determining fair value.33
Value determined by capitalizing the average earnings over a five year
period has been considered merely evidentiary, and if this formula is
used to the exclusion of any other evidence, the valuation may be held
erroneous as a matter of law.
34
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Restrictive covenants are of many varieties and have widely vary-
ing effects on stock valuation. They may make a sale impossible 35
and render the value practically nil or show that the stock has no "fair
29. The Tax Court judge deplored the use of family holding companies to deal in
securities for the owners as a device to avoid taxes. He felt that the only real or
practical way to value such an investment company was "by primarily considering
the value of the securities owned by the corporation. Any other approach would . . .
be futile." 15i F. (2d) xO2, io5.
3o. 62 F. Supp. 234 (W. D. Okla., i944).
31. Ibid. at page 237. See also Colonial Trust Co. v. Kraemer, 63 F. Supp. 866
(D. C. Conn., 1945).
32. A. B. C. Dohrmann, ig B. T. A. 507 (1930).
33. True v. U. S., 5I F. Supp. 72o, 726 (1943).
34. A. R. M. 34 was the formula used to determine the value of a business on March
1. 1913, and it is still used to determine the value of intangibles such as good will,
special skill, or business "know how." Worcester County Trust Co. v. Comm'r., R.,
134 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. Ist, 1943).
35. Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 3o0 U. S. 481 (1937).
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market value." 36 Few covenants will affect value in the same way.
One may operate to the advantage of both the seller and purchaser, to
maintain the market or enhance the market value.37 Another may
merely give a certain person a first opportunity to purchase without
any substantial effect on value,38 or the restriction may be as to the
length of time within which no sale may be made, where the courts
haVe attempted a rather arbitrary distinction between limitations of
more or less than a year. 9 But it is not with this type of restrictive
covenant that we are concerned-we shall instead examine the cove-
nants which mention or attempt to set a price. What affect on valua-
tion do these have?
These covenants may be either ineffective, partially effective, or
fully effective to establish a value for the stock. In determining into
which of the three above categories a covenant falls, the courts attempt
to discover the actual interest that is being transferred. The test does
-not appear to b "specific enforceability of the restriction," as some
courts have decided.
40
The test seems to be the converse of the rule which tests the tax-
ability of a pre-death trust in the decedent's estate. Thereunder there
is included in the gross estate of a decedent the value of any trust
which he established during life over which at the date of death he
possessed a power to alter, amend, revoke or terminate. If the decedent
had some beneficial interest, his estate paid a tax. The test for the
restrictive covenant which is fully effective in establishing its stipulated
value as the value of the stock is: Does someone have a vested adverse
interest in the stock, effective during decedent's lifetime, so that the
value of the property is not affected by death? Did the owner sur-
36. Propper v. Comm'r., 89 F. (2d) 6i (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; U. S. v. State Street
Trust Co., 124 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. ist, 1942).
37. G. & K. Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r., 76 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935). If a cov-
enant provides that the stock can only be paid for out of dividends, its value is actually
far greater than that stated on its face, or that listed as book value, even though a sec-
ond covenant requires that the stock be resold to the corporation at book value if'em-
ployment in the concern ceases. Behles v. Comm'r., 87 F. (2d) 228 (C. C. A. 7th,
1937).
38. Jay v. Darling, 4 B. T. A. 499 (1926).
39. T. W. Henritze, 28 B. T. A. izi73 (933); Heiner v. Gwinner, 14 1 F. (2d)
723 (C. C. A. 2d, i94o). See Goldwasser v. Comm'r., 47 B. T. A. 445 (1942), aff'd.,
142 F. (2d) 556 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), where taxpayer could make no offering but must
hold it as investment.
40. Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F. (2d) 682 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), and Lomb v. Sugden,
82 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936). Stockholders agreed that transfer of shares was
forbidden without first offering it to other stockholders at a price about 30% less than
market at the date of decedent's death. It was held that the taxable value of the stock
was limited by this contract since it was specifically enforceable. The value of the
stock to the estate could be no greater than that with which the deceased parted.
But the courts have been extremely reluctant of late to follow these two cases, and
generally find some ground for distinguishing. See Krauss v. U. S., 14o F. (2d) 510
(C. C. A. 5th, 1944).
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render a part of his legal rights or present interest in the stock? 41 If
he did, the restrictive covenant will be fully effective in establishing
a value for the stock.4 2  Because few owners care to restrict their
ownership to this extent, such covenants appear quite rarely.
The mass of litigation concerns the other two types-the partially
effective, and the ineffective covenants. These two types are worded
quite similarly, but whether or not the covenant determines value seems
to depend upon whether the transferor is a donor or a testator. If he
is a donor, and his stock is subject to an option at a fixed or deter-
minable price, the Commissioner generally allows a reasonable dis-
count in value for the effect of the restriction, 43 but he is not bound by
it.44  It the estate tax is involved, however, the general rule is that
the stock must be included at its full value in the tax return; the differ-
ence in price between the option and market is a legacy to the optionee.4 5
Although covenants do not often establish a value so far as the
estate is concerned, they do fix a value upon the stock for the optionee.
In Mack v. Commissioner 46 the taxpayer acquired stock under an
option in the will of his father at a price equal to one-half of its actual
41. Estate of Matthews, 3 T. C. 525, 528 (i944).
42. Comm'r. v. Bensel, ioo F. (2d) 639 (C. C. A. 3d, i938), where decedent
agreed with his son that his estate would sell stock at son's option if the son would
continue in his executive position in the father's corporation during the latter's life-
time.
See also: Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U. S. 481 (i937), where the cov-
enant operated to prevent a sale: Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. io6 (936), holding
that the value to the optionee at the time of acquisition is the option price, not the
fair market value.
43. James v. Comm'r., 148 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d, i945). Petitioner gave his
son ioo shares in a closely held corporation which were subject to the stockholder's
agreement that they could not be transferred unless they were first offered to the
stockholders at $2oo per share. The book value at the time of the gift was $385.05
per share. The Commissioner made an allowance for the covenant by valuing it at
$310.00.
Raymond J. Moore, 3 T' C. 1205 (I944). Donee could not dispose of stock with-
out first offering it to the directors of the corporation in their individual capacity, then
to the stockholders at the adjusted book value. All gave consent to the trust. In view
of the high earnings of the corporation, the court felt that the Commissioner had
allowed a sufficient deduction for the restrictive effect of the agreement.
Estate of James Smith, 46 B. T. A. 337 (942).
44. Kline v. Comm'r., 130 F. (2d) 742 (C. C. A. 3d, 194a). Two covenants were
involved. The first prevented sale without the consent of the company. The second
subjected the stock to a one year option to purchase at 333% to 75% of book value
if the owner left the employ of the company. The gift was approved, and petitioner
valued at 3331%. The Commissioner chose 75% of book plus surplus earnings avail-
able on the stock. The Commissioner's determination was upheld.
45. The Cern Securities Corp. v. U. S., io2 Ct. Cl. 86 (i944). An option to pur-
chase iooo shares at $Io when market was $22.75 per share amounts to a combination
promise to sell and a promise to make a gift of $12,75o.
Estate of Matthews, 3 T. C. 525 (i944). Decedent and a business associate agreed
that the survivor should have an option to purchase all the stock of the deceased at
$9o.oo per share if purchased within three months of death. Both parties were free
to dispose of stock during life. Fair market value for estate tax purposes was held
to be $120.oo and not the option price.
Claire G. Hoffman, 2 T. C. ix6o (943). The difference between the option price
and market is a legacy.
46. r48 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945).
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market value. When the optionee decided to sell the stock, he could
not include the value of his option in his base to determine his capital
gain, although the estate may have paid a tax upon its value as a
legacy. The basis of the stock was held to be the amount which he
actually paid. Hence, as the law now stands, such an option is subject
to double taxation, once under the estate tax as a legacy, and a second
time under the income tax as a capital gain.
47
TAX PRACTICE
When an appeal is made from the valuation set by the Commis-
sioner, the courts are wont to notice the subsequent history of the
stock. The Electrolux shares in the Groff v. Munford 48 case had
dropped to $22.00 per share at the end of the third month following
the gift. The Tax Court is not obliged to close its mind to subsequent
facts which demonstrate the correctness of the Commissioner's deter-
mination.49  It can be argued, of course, that events subsequent to
the critical date should have no effect upon taxable value. Actually,
this "hindsight" is not used to establish a value, but is used merely as
evidence to prove that a valuation chosen on a certain date was correct.
To this practice there can be no real objection, not only because it
proves that no real mistake was made, but also because it may often
inure to the taxpayer's benefit. If the stock drops in price, he can
introduce into evidence the lower rates of subsequent months to prove
that the Commissioner valued too high.
This was done in the Avery case 50 to obtain a lower valuation
than the market on the day of a gift of Montgomery Ward Company
stock. The Tax Court studied the quotations on this stock not only
for the entire month of the gift, but for the two succeeding months as
well, to conclude that a fair valuation was $36.50 per share instead of
$37.50 as claimed by the Commissioner.
The tax lawyer should marshal his strongest case for the Tax
Court, for here is his best chance to overrule the Commissioner. Gen-
erally speaking, the Government is no more anxious to litigate than
is the taxpayer. But if the case does go to the Tax Court, the likeli-
47. Despite § 113 (a) (5) of 26 U. S. C. A.
48. i5o F. (2d) 825 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), cited supra note io.
49. Mott v. Comm'r., 139 F. (2d) .317 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943).
5o. Sewell L. Avery, 3 T. C. 963 (1944). Four gifts of 6,5oo shares of M. W.
and 4,000 shares of U. S. Gypsum were made on Dec. 31. For January and February
following, the M. W. Co. stock varied between 3514 and 39Y2, while the U. S. Gypsum
varied between 6o and 69Y2. The Tax Court determined that 36Y2 and 643/2 were
respectively the fair market values. The court took note of a disposal of 4,700 shares
of U. S. Gypsum two years later, which was effected without depressing the market.
Similarly, a secondary distribution of Ward stock a year after the gift brought $37.50
per share to the vendors, when market was $39.oo.
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hood that its decision will be accepted is great. Unless the Commis-
sioner feels that the Tax Court is clearly in error, he will not appeal
further, for appeals from the Tax Court have not been fruitful. The
Circuit Courts constantly emphasize that the determination of the Tax
Court is not subject to review if supported by some substantial evi-
dence.51 In fact, the statute provides that the Tax Court may be
reversed only on the law.
52
The question of value is a question of fact. But the decision may
involve one of law.5 3  While the Circuit Court may not challenge facts
found by the Tax Court if supported by some substantial evidence, the
determination of the rule or standard of valuation to be applied, raises a
question of law which is reviewable by the higher court.5 4 But ordi-
narily, weighing the evidence, determining its probative value, and
drawing inferences therefrom is peculiarly and exclusively the func-
tion of the Tax Court. 55
The general rule is that the burden of showing that there is an
overassessment is on the taxpayer.5 6 Hence he must make out a case
to show that the Commissioner's determination is invalid, but he is
not required to establish by evidence the correct amount." However,
the same evidence that indicates that the Commissioner had overvalued
will generally affirmatively show the correct value.
In the rare case where the Commissioner values stock above
market rate, is this rule as to burden of proof changed? It can be
argued that since the regulations require market rate where available,
the burden of proof should fall upon the party who wishes to modify
5I. Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942). Here trading was
"continuous" and the amounts of stock changing hands "substantial," but there were
no trades involving 133,000 or 400,000 shares. The Court affirmed the determinations
of the Board of Tax Appeals at $3.1o and $3.8o per share against the Commissioner
and market of $4.75 and $4.56 per share. The Circuit Court made no attempt to an-
swer the skilled arguments on behalf of the government, contenting itself to cite six-
teen cases in the various circuits in support of its decision.
52. Int. Rev. Code § 1141 (c) () ('939) ; John Kelly v. Comm'r., 66 S. Ct. 299
(1946) ; Dobson v. Comm'r., 320 U. S. 489 (1943).
53. Powers v. Comm'r., 312 U. S. 259 (194).
54. Comm'r. v. McCann, 146 F. (2d) 385, 386 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944). "We say
nothing as to how the shares shall be appraised; that is, the Tax Court's duty, from
any interference in which we must rigidly abstain. It may come to the same conclu-
sions after weighing all the relevant factors." As a matter of law here, the evidence
did not support the findings, because the lower court failed to weigh these relevant
factors: (a) The average dividend of i2% for the nine preceding years; (b) The tax-
payer owned two-thirds of the stock, and could therefore change the by-laws con-
taining the restrictive covenant at will; (c) The prospective earnings of the corpora-
tion; (d) The life expectancy of the donor, since the gift was to his wife.
55. Zanuck v. Comm'r., 149 F. (2d) 714 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945). 'Petitioner urged
that the Tax Court had failed to give sufficient weight to the evidence showing the
war's effect upon the corporation's extensive foreign holdings, or to the effect of its
current labor troubles. Here there was a gift of 3o,ooo shares of Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp. stock in trust to three children. No argument was made for applying
the blockage rule. Market rate prevailed.
56. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U. S. 507, 514 0935).
57. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Comm'r., 134 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. Ist, 1943).
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the market rate. In Estate of Spencer v. Commissioner,58 the court
refused to expressly deny the presumption of correctness of the Com-
missioner's valuation, but it did say that if the Commissioner was to
choose any value other than market rate, that he should show the
other relevant facts and elements that affected value. This he had not
done, so the Tax Court in effect sustained petitioner's contention by
valuing at market.
CONCLUSION
The Internal Revenue Code, the Regulations and the Courts seek
to apply a primarily objective test of value. They seek facts, but
facts can never be completely divorced from opinion. Obviously, no
test can be completely objective, because buyers and sellers in any
market make subjective tests of value before trading. The most ob-
jective test of all, namely, actual market rate, is nothing less than a
series of individual subjective estimates by those who do trade.
The normal way of showing value is by evidence of actual sales
upon a free and open market. It is also well settled that value may be
shown by the opinion of any competent person having knowledge of
the facts, whether an expert or an ordinary witness, 59 though the
tendency is to treat this as secondary evidence because subjective. If
expert, they should testify in blockage cases to the result of a skillful
liquidation of the block over a reasonable time, and not to the result
to be expected from a liquidation to be accomplished in ten days.60
Too, the courts seem to prefer opinion evidence based upon good busi-
ness sense to the use of formulas, although the use of a formula cap-
italizing earnings is permissible as a factor to be considered along with
other evidence in arriving at a value.6'
In the blockage field, the rationale of economics is permitted to
temper a determination of value, because otherwise, the application
of a purely objective test becomes arbitrary, and, for closely held stock,
objective evidence is difficult to obtain. Tax Commissioners are un-
willing to accept par or book value, especially where the corporate
earnings record belies such figures. They then attempt to capitalize
earnings and to apply some test such as A. R. M. 34. Finally, in the
field of restrictive covenants, although the stock itself may be valued
objectively by market in some instances, the restriction must be
analyzed, and a subjective estimate of its effect upon the value of the
stock must be made.
58. Tax Court Docket No. 2254, Oct. 12, 1945.
59. Montana Railway Company v. Warren, 137 U. S. 348, 353 (1890).
6o. Richardson v. Comm'r., 151 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
61. White & Wells Co. v. Comm'r., 5o F. (2d) 120 (C. C. A. 2d, 193I) ; Robert-
son v. Routzahn, 75 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935) ; Estate of James Smith, 46 B.
T. A. 337 (i942). Average return for five years is capitalized usually at io%, but
often at 15%, and sometimes at 20%, if the business is speculative.
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Although there may be some logic in such positions as that
valuing large blocks at a lesser price per unit than small holdings will
benefit the rich 62 and that if the market rises no reduction for blockage
should be allowed, these would seem to have no justification under our
tax plan. The statute already taxes large estates at higher rates than
lesser estates. Any further adjustment necessary should be made
through these rates-not by torturing concepts of valuation. It must
be remembered that valuation comes into the picture solely to determine
how large the estate is on the date of death or the gift at the date of gift.
Ultimately, the best criterion for measuring value probably lies
in an analysis such as a prudent investor would require of an ex-
perienced broker. This might call for a revision of existing regulations
to permit a freer exercise of discretion by the tax assessor. Evi-
dentially this should require consideration of all the factors already
outlined, with emphasis on the methods by which the stock could in
fact be disposed of.
62. Bingham's Adm. v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 318, 244 S. W. 781 (1922), aff'd.,
199 Ky. 402, 251 S. W. 986 (1923) ; Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A.
8th, 1942).
